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Collective Wisdom and Civilization:
Revitalizing Ancient Wisdom Traditions
Thomas Kiefer
tkiefer@fordham.edu
Introduction
Our question is: can collective wisdom save civilization? On one rendition this question is
rather straightforward and can be empirically answered. For if ‘collective wisdom’ is
understood as the collective knowledge of a society or culture and ‘civilization’ is associated
with a certain level of social or technological advancement, then our question concerns
whether collective knowledge can help create or maintain certain kinds of social structures
or technologies, certain levels of urbanization or kinds of civil infrastructural technology.
Characterized this way, the answer to our question is an obvious, and perhaps trivial, “yes.”
But both ‘collective wisdom’ and ‘civilization’ have alternative definitions, which render
our question less trivial and more important, though more difficult to answer.
‘Collective wisdom’ may not refer merely to the collective knowledge of a particular society
or culture, but can refer instead to wisdom understood as a collective interpretation of human
experience, of what kind of intellect, knowledge, experience, and judgment is required to
live a good and successful human life as such.
‘Civilization,’ although often associated solely with certain levels of social and
technological advancement, can also refer to the moral status and level of development of
an action or individual as when we refer to specific actions or persons as “civilized” or
“uncivilized” in a distinctly normative moral sense.1 To be 'civilized' in an individual moral
sense is what Aristotle called to be eleutherios, to have the individual disposition to be
concerned with virtue (arētē) in both thought and action as the result of proper education
and habituation.2
With these alternative definitions, our question becomes: Can collective interpretations of
human experience, interpretations of the thoughts and skills required to live a good and
successful human life as such, create or maintain individual dispositions to be concerned
with virtue?

Of course, the social and technological senses of ‘civilization’ also lend themselves to normative uses, which
served as a basis for some peoples and nations to deem less developed ones as inferior and able to be mistreated
(or forcefully reformed).
2
See Terrance Irwin’s translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1999, p.331 (cf. 1179b5-10).
1
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This essay is an attempt to answer our question thus formulated. I argue that, in one sense,
yes, collective wisdom can save civilization. But in a more important sense, collective
wisdom should be understood as a form of civilization, as the result and expression of a
moral civilizing-process that comes about through the creation and transmission of
collective interpretations of human experience and the concomitant skills to be developed.
Collective wisdom traditions function in this manner by providing an interpretation of what
it means to be human and what thoughts, skills, and actions are required to live a successful
human life at the most general level of analysis. Collective wisdom can have a civilizing
effect on individuals, and indirectly on societies, by providing a type of orienting theoretical
and practical framework for understanding the proper relationship between the self, others,
and the world. Such traditions in effect provide a “blueprint” for the successful human life
as such, by providing guidance on thought and action, on what is appropriate to think, feel,
desire, and do in theoretical and practical contexts.
A wise individual will be a 'civilized' individual in this moral sense, an individual who is
properly habituated and educated so as to now reflectively endorse and desire thinking and
acting in morally civilized ways.
However, this understanding of collective wisdom and civilization is in many ways today
controversial and met with justified critiques and skeptical criticisms. To defend this way of
approaching and answering our question against these critiques, I turn first to ancient
wisdom traditions from civilizations in ancient India, China, and Greece as paradigms for
understanding exactly how collective wisdom can achieve the end of civilizing humanity.
Based on this analysis, I sketch the outlines of a revitalized wisdom tradition able to civilize
individuals today. But any such tradition must be updated to reflect the advancement of
modern natural science and to meet the demands of living in our diverse, pluralistic, and
globalized world.
Ancient Wisdom Traditions
The term ‘ancient wisdom tradition’ requires explicit definition. By ‘ancient wisdom
traditions’ I mean what we would call today the ethical-philosophical-religious traditions
that developed across various ancient cultures during the so-called "axial age,"3
approximately 800 BCE to 200 BCE.

3

This is a term popularized by the philosopher Karl Jaspers in the early 20th century to reflect the radical
changes in thought that occurred in several places around the globe in this period.
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This age of “turning” saw the rise of new forms of thought, new ways of thinking about
society, religion, ethics, and what it means to be human. This entailed reflection on the
implicit aspects of human experience, claims and assumptions about the nature of reality, as
well as a critique of social values and habits deemed inimical to harmony, order, or virtue.
To be more specific, by ancient wisdom traditions I will be referring to the wisdom traditions
that developed from the dominant strands of thought within ancient India, China, and
Greece. It is within these ancient civilizations that distinctive wisdom traditions developed
for the first time in recorded human history, often in contrast to previous cultural, religious,
and mytho-poetic traditions. For this reason, it is to these traditions we can look to
understand general features or requirements of wisdom traditions before turning to our
contemporary situation and need for updated or revitalized ancient wisdom.
This emphasis on India, China, and Greece is not to conceal or deny the influence of
Egyptian and Near Eastern influences on ancient wisdom, nor is it the claim that such
traditions did not exist at all in pre-Columbian America, Africa, or Austronesia. Generally
we should acknowledge that much of “western” civilization originated from non-western
sources,4 but the traditions of ancient India, China, and Greece have had a type of
cohesiveness and influence that other traditions have not.
What are some features of the wisdom traditions of ancient India, China, and Greece?
Generally, each of these traditions focused on ‘wisdom’ in some form, whether understood
as contemplative insight into the true nature of reality, or theoretical knowledge about the
eternal law or order of the cosmos, or practical knowledge about what constitutes the good
human life.
Importantly, this type of wisdom was understood as a certain kind of insight or knowledge
or way of life accessible to normal human beings without the aid of revelation or mystical
insight derived from super-human sources or super-natural faculties, respectively.5 The
4

The particularities of western thought specifically tend to dissolve when it is recognized that Greek culture,
the foundation of "western culture," is really a product and amalgamation of Egyptian and Indus-Valley
civilizational influences. This fact, however, is often met with suspicion and skepticism, especially when
reactionaries defend the purity of the western tradition (see Mary Lefkowitz’s 1997 Not out of Africa).

However, if one can get past these presumptions, then it becomes clear that "western" and "eastern" civilization
and philosophy have numerous overlaps in both form and content. Indian forms of idealism come very close
to certain Parmenidian, Platonic, and Neo-Platonic forms; see P.S. Sastri's 1976 Indian Idealism and R.
Harris’s 1981 Neo-Platonism and Indian Philosophy, for examples. More generally, the trend of emphasizing
the continuity across traditions can be seen in the emerging field of “world philosophy;” see Robert C.
Solomon's and Kaathleen M. Higgins's 2003 From Africa to Zen: An Invitation to World Philosophy for an
important example.
5
The difference between a wisdom tradition and a mystical or religious tradition was not clear-cut in the
ancient world, at least not to the extent that philosophy is distinguished from religion today. This is no mistake,
for wisdom, mystical, and religious traditions make metaphysical claims about the ultimate nature of reality.
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attempt to provide an articulation of the intelligibility of human behavior is found generally
in myths, cultural narratives, and moral parables as well as specifically in the works of
individual thinkers considered wise or sage-like; individuals such as Confucius, Aristotle,
and the Buddha stand out in this regard.6
The specific conception of wisdom differs across traditions. For example, following
Pythagoras and the Pre-Socratics,7 wisdom for the Athenian school, Socrates, Plato, 8
Aristotle and their followers, was importantly related to a specific type of scientific
knowledge (epistēmē) and practical wisdom (phronēsis) that results from the proper usage
of reason (logos) and understanding (nous)9 concerned with the nature of reality (Kosmos).10
In Confucianism, Taoism, and the Yin-Yang tradition in China, wisdom is not as closely tied
to the proper rule of reason or usage of our distinctive cognitive capacities in the Greek
sense, Chinese thinkers will even speak of a mind-heart complex that the Greeks would
likely reject. The focus instead in the Chinese traditions is on properly orienting oneself
according to the nature of reality and responding appropriately to the demands of social
existence.
The difference, however, lies in the method of each and the ways in which such claims are realized and put
forth. Wisdom traditions, I contend, place an emphasis on human capacities and faculties, whatever these may
be, as distinct from divine revelation or the operation of super-natural faculties. What we call super-natural
may have been part of what, say Plato, would have called the natural state of the human soul, for example, not
something that requires an intervention or change in the natural order.
6
Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a-1095b; Lee Dian Rainey, 2010, p.23-30.The importance of eastern thinkers is
often overlooked or diminished in western thought insofar as these eastern thinkers are considered somehow
“not philosophers” or external to philosophy proper (i.e. philosophy in some “western” sense). However, such
dismissal of ancient and non-western sources of wisdom often comes at the expense of meaningful interaction
and engagement.
7
The Ionian search for a fundamental principle of nature can be interpreted as a type of proto-science or early
form of science, insofar as they attempted to explain the natural world without resorting to mythic explanation
or super-natural vagaries. Perhaps Anaximander is an outlier in this regard, in that his reference to the
"indefinite" (apeiron) as the archē provides little by way of actual explanation.
8
This can be seen from throughout both the "earliest" Socratic dialogues such as the Euthyphro, Apology, and
Crito, to the middle Platonic dialogues including Gorgias and Republic, and onward to the later dialogues,
Timaeus, Statesman, and Laws. Aristotle devotes significant time and space to a consideration of these issues
throughout the works attributed to him, perhaps most clearly in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.
9
Reference to the divine mind or Nous plays an important role in both Plato's Timaeus and of course in Book
XII of Aristotle's Metaphysics, as the prime unmoved mover and final cause of the Kosmos (Timaeus, 29a,
34b-c, 42c; Metaphysics, bk. 12, 1074b-1076a).
10
Greek and Roman philosophers up to and including Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics
made metaphysical naturalism and its ethical consequences the centerpiece of their philosophical
considerations. See Sarah Broadie’s 2010 essay, "The Ancient Greeks" in the Oxford Handbook of Causation,
for a detailed analysis of this line of thought. As noted in the above, the idea that the natural world constitutes
a Kosmos or a law-governed whole may be considered a hallmark of much of ancient Greek philosophy.
Although there were alternative perspectives put forth by deterministic thinkers such as Democritus and
Empedocles, both thinkers who denied teleology in the form of final causation, these mechanistic and
probabilistic natural philosophies nevertheless made some appeal to law-like function (nomos) or rulegoverned regularity of nature (see Aristotle's Physics 186a-187b; Long and Sedley, 1987, p.266; Inwood, 2009,
p.203).
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In the Yin-Yang tradition, wisdom entails living according to the interdependence of reality,
despite the appearance of disparate opposed binaries (e.g., active/passive, male/female,
good/evil, etc.).11 The wise Taoist sage is one who lives a life in harmony (he) or resonance
(gan ying) with the nature of the Tao or “way” of Nature or Heaven (Tian).12 The Confucian
sage (junzi) obtains humaneness (ren) and thereby wisdom by properly cultivating virtue,
responding appropriately to the demands of specific social relationships, performing
important rituals, and respecting just laws (li).13
In the Vedic and Brahmanic traditions, wisdom refers to a type of insight into or
contemplation of truths concerning the relationship between the ego, the true self (Ātman),
and the nature of reality as such (Brahman), which in turn has important practical relevance
for what amounts to correct action (karma) and proper ritualization according to the eternal
law (Santana dharma).14
These are but a few examples from these traditions; see similar strands can be found in the
Stoic,15 Sramana,16 Mohist, 17 or Neo-Confucian18 traditions as well.
We must be careful here because much of what I am focusing on are the dominant themes
and strands in these traditions, which is not to imply that these traditions were by any means

11

Yin and Yang are the opposing yet complimenting principles of reality, which manifest in various dualities
that must coexist for reality to be constituted (light-dark, heaven-earth, hot-cool, active-passive, man-woman);
this is in some ways similar to the Empedoclean conception of ‘Love and ‘Strife’ as archai.
12
The concept of the 'Tao' most likely began as an ethical consideration based upon accepted principles of
Yin-Yang before turning more fully into a metaphysical principle, the eternal Tao (see Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching,
specifically ch. 1.1-2.3; 8.1-10.3; 18.1-20.2; 23.1-24).
13
The teachings attributed to Confucius are filled with references to implicit, ordered patterns in human
activities, for example, with the Five Confucian Relationships. Specifically, this theme reoccurs throughout
the Analects (Confucian Analects, bk. 1, ch. 1-2; 6-7; 9-11; 13-14; bk. 2, ch. 1-3; see also bk. 3 and 4).
14
The Vedas represent the foundational texts in the tradition of classical Indian philosophy. These take the
form of rishis or sacred hymns that outline the proper ordering of the world, up to and including human
behavior, social arrangement, and religious ceremony (Rigveda, hymn 1, hymn 4-11.). The Rigveda is the
most important of the Vedas besides the later Vedanta or Upanishads.
15
Due to the fragmentary nature of Stoic philosophy, this section is derived in large part from the Long and
Sedley's 1987 collection, The Hellenistic Philosophers, which collects primary and secondary texts from
various Greek and Roman Stoic philosophers and their critics. Specifically, see p.266-280; p.313-344; and
p.359-423.
16
Sramana tradition gave rise to the yoga, Jainism, Buddhism, and some schools of Hinduism.
17
Mozi was a Taoist before developing his own framework for understanding ethical commitments; at first
glance his views align closely with utilitarian principles (Collinson, 2000, p.226-232).
18
In many ways the Neo-Confucian thinkers, influenced by Taoism and later Chan Buddhism, played the role
of Plato to the Socrates of Confucius. By this I mean that the Neo-Confucian thinkers, beginning with Zhou
Dun-yi, developed a metaphysic that aligns with the ethical principles outlined by their master, who did not
himself write any texts and focused mainly on ethical concerns rather than metaphysical considerations; see
Siu-chi Huang's 1999 Essentials of Neo-Confucianism, especially the historical and philosophical contexts
chapter and chapter two.
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monolithic, and like every tradition, each has its own associated set of subsequent detractors,
skeptics, and offshoot traditions.19
Nevertheless, and despite important differences and disagreements within and across
traditions in the specifics, ancient wisdom traditions, both dominant and reactionary, were
generally concerned with addressing or removing to various degrees: suffering,
unhappiness, or illusion; and conversely, concerned with attempting to create in or lead the
individual or collective to: pleasure, happiness, or insight.
The specifics in each case do differ owing to the particularities of the culture and language
in which these traditions arose, but there are nevertheless common themes and elements not
completely determined by the particularities of a culture, language, or time period.
That such interpretations of human experience and human nature can become a tradition at
all, let alone traditions capable of spanning hundreds of years and multiple cultures and
peoples, is significant and cannot be easily denied by the most ardent defenders of relativism
or constructivism.
But in the interest of space and to maintain focus on our question at hand, I will examine
only two related themes found in these ancient wisdom traditions, one theoretical and one
practical, though necessarily related: 1) the relationship between ethics and metaphysics,
and 2) the moral development of the self and human nature.
The Relationship between Ethics and Metaphysics
The most important aspect of these ancient wisdom traditions for addressing our question is
the belief that there is an essential relationship between ethics and metaphysics and that
understanding and living out this relationship is a necessary condition for being wise. The
idea is that what one ought to think, feel, desire, and do is necessarily a function of the way
reality is, specifically the nature of human beings and how human beings “fit” within the
context of the world, usually considered as an ordered totality (Nature, Tao, Kosmos,
Brahman).

19

For even the Skeptics and Sophists held that their conclusions were correct about the nature of things by
emphasizing agnostic indeterminacy and the supposed gulf between nomos and phusis, or human-made law
and nature, respectively. Even atomists like the Epicureans, thinkers who rejected the rationalism of the
Athenian School and Stoicism, believed that an adequate understanding of the world had ethical consequences,
namely happiness as the lack of the fear of death and the judgment of the gods. Even the anti-rationalist
dimensions of Taoism and Chan Buddhism in China rejected Confucianism because they held that it was all
too human when compared to the truth of non-human reality. And even the non-orthodox strands in Indian
philosophy, Carvaka, Jainism, and Buddhism, claimed to various degrees to describe the true nature of reality,
often in direct contrast to certain elements in the Vedic tradition.
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Relatedly, the nature of reality is understood through necessary reference to human beings
and human nature, and this is one main reason why these traditions often rely on organic
metaphors and anthropomorphic language to describe reality.
In these traditions wisdom requires a type of metaphysical or theoretical understanding of
both what is the case and what ought to be the case, which cannot be separated without
incoherency. The wise individual is able to live a successful human life because she
understands what it means to be a human and what is required to live harmoniously with the
nature of reality, of which human beings are but one part. This in turn requires understanding
human experience and human nature as manifestations of the nature of reality, capable of
reflectively identifying with and harmoniously ordering one’s life according to the recurrent
patterns found in nature. Achieving this ideal entails what the Stoics called “living according
to nature” (kata phusin),20 what the Taoists called Wu-Wei or the 'way of naturalness' or
harmony through non-action,21 and what the Vedic-Brahamanic adherents call moksa or
liberatory self-knowledge of the identity between the true Self (Ātman) and the fundamental
principle of reality, Brahman.22
However, understanding and living out the relationship between ethics and metaphysics is
not automatic because false beliefs and hallow desires can prevent human beings from
recognizing and adequately responding to it. It becomes difficult or impossible to
acknowledge that metaphysical knowledge is ethically important because it is required to
help us ignorance or misunderstanding about what is truly real, or what is desirable and
valuable for beings like us.
Conversely, it may be impossible to acknowledge that ethical knowledge and action are
metaphysically important because human beings are understood in these traditions as partly
responsible for the proper function of reality insofar as human beings play a certain role in
its operation.
It may even be held that metaphysics and ethics are not related at all, that metaphysics can
be done without reference to human beings and value, or that ethics can be independent from

20

In Stoic philosophy, living 'kata phusin' or 'according to nature,' was the metaphysical and ethical end or
telos of human nature; according to Seneca, "For man is a rational animal. Man's ideal state is realized when
he has fulfilled the purpose for which he was born. And what is it that reason demands of him? Something
very easy - that he live in accordance with his own nature" (Seneca, 1969, p.88-89). The relevant meanings of
the ancient Greek word phusis range from 1) nature as an active process of becoming (e.g. the growth of a
seed into a tree), to 2) the specific characteristics of the thing in question (e.g. the nature of a dog), to 3) a
normative term that refers to characteristics an individual ought to have owing to its nature in the second sense;
and finally, to 4) the ordered whole of all that is (Kosmos) as determined by law (nomos) and structure (logos).
I owe this breakdown of the meanings of phusis relevant for the Stoics to Adolf Bonhöffer by way of William
O. Stephens; see, Bonhöffer, 1894, p.13-14, and Stephens, 1994, p.276.
21
Tao Te Ching, ch. 2.
22
Katha Upanishad p.1, ch.2, verse 24; Mandukya Upanishad, verse 2.Brihadaranyaka Upanishad p.1, ch.4,
verse 10.
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the way reality is on some more fundamental level underneath social and cultural
constructions.
In these traditions the way to address these potential incoherencies is through a focus on
human nature as the manifestation of the relationship between ethics and metaphysics.
The concept of human nature (atman,23 hsing, phusis) is fundamental in these traditions
because human nature is considered the intersection between ethics and metaphysics and a
site for the interpretation of both. Claims about human nature, such as the claim that a human
being is a rational animal or a social animal or a divine animal, are theoretical claims that
have direct practical consequences, concerning, for example, the proper trajectory or end
goal of human development and the objective conditions under which human beings can or
ought to survive, live, and flourish. That being said, these traditions do not deny, though
perhaps they are often victim to, the ambiguity and danger associated with identifying
human nature and making epistemological claims about our access to the metaphysical
nature of reality.
This ambiguity and potential danger was raised as far back as the ancient Greek Sophistic
claim that much of what we attribute to be fundamental aspects of (human) nature (phusis)
is socially or culturally constructed (nomos). But the relation of this ambiguity to wisdom
comes in the form of an enlightenment or transcendence that results from correctly
identifying human nature as a microcosm that mirrors the macrocosm of the totality of
reality.
This is perhaps most clearly seen in Plato's allegory of the Cave, which tells of the dangers
of illusion and the attempt to enlighten others, but similar ideas can be seen in the Yin-Yang
and Taoist warnings against relying on dualisms created by human language and the Hindu
understanding of Maya, the phenomenal veil of illusion that underlies naïve realism. In these
traditions the danger lies in erroneously identifying some aspect of human nature as essential
when it is merely contingent, say the assumption that Homeric conceptions of virtue are
simply necessary and natural. The associated danger is the distortion or concealment of the
relationship between ethics and metaphysics, which in an extreme form entails the denial
that we have any access to human nature and reality as it really is beyond mere phenomenal
appearances and the social constructs.
The Moral Development of the Self and Human Nature
The first theme concerned the necessary conditions for wisdom in terms of theoretical
beliefs about the relationship between ethics and metaphysics. The second theme concerns
the necessary conditions for wisdom in terms of practical belief, desire, and action.
I am using the lower-case ‘A’ to distinguish between the atman composed of five ‘sheaths’ or kosas (physical
[annamaya kosa], breath [pranamaya kosa], mind [manomaya kosa], intellect [vijnanamaya kosa], and bliss
[anandamaya kosa]) and the Ātman that is the innermost core and true nature of the Self.
23
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These two themes, of course, are directly related to and augment each other, for, to borrow
phraseology from Kant, theoretical belief without practical action would be empty and
practical action without theoretical belief would be blind. But given the relationship between
ethics and metaphysics, how can the relationship between ethics and metaphysics be
cultivated and actually lived out in terms of practical belief, desire, and action?
The answer to this question is found in the belief in these traditions that the self and human
nature do not begin as fully developed or complete, both developmentally and morally, but
can and must be developed over time toward certain ends or goals of fulfillment.
The idea is that human beings developmentally and morally begin from an initial, inchoate
state, in many ways less than human in a normative sense of the term. From an initial state
of egocentrism, the individual develops morally -- given the appropriate kinds of habituation
and education, resulting in a concern for virtue or justice or humaneness. Living out the
relationship between ethics and metaphysics is a process of reaching the most complete state
of human moral development, which entails an understanding of the natural moral laws of
reality, or the relationship between self, other, and the world.
This is to become ‘civilized,’ to be free from hollow, defective, and irrational desires and
instead willing to act in distinctly moral ways. But this requires the individual to identify
with the higher parts of the self over and above the lower parts and proclivities that we have
toward what is unhealthy, base, and disordered.
In the initial inchoate state, of both individual ontogenesis and moral development, the
human being is driven by lower and more basic aspects of our nature. Clear examples of this
characterization of moral development is found in the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of
the tripartite conception of the soul, the five sheaths of kosas of the self in the Hindu
tradition,24 and Mencius’s four beginnings or “germinations” (tuan), natural predispositions
that each individual human being has toward virtue, which can in turn be cultivated and
grown into an internalized disposition toward virtuous thought and action.25 In either case,
moral development or the lack thereof concerns the cultivation of and identification with the
higher parts of the true self, the self that is most fully human, beyond all particular attributes
and contingent identity characteristics.
The moral development of normal human individuals can and must be directed or else it
may never mature or may develop in a twisted manner. This is achieved through the correct
kinds of external stimuli, from moral habituation, socialization, and role modeling toward
the end of cultivating an internal disposition toward virtue, and ultimately wisdom. This
development enables an individual to associate with ever larger categories, beginning from
a concern with the ego, to family members, community, city- or nation-state, and eventually
Nature or the totality of reality itself.
24
25

See previous footnote, 23.
Graham, 2002, p.20.
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Moral development does not require the total denial of the lower parts of the soul and the
selfish or vicious predispositions that we also have, but a channeling of our amoral needs,
drives, and desires in virtuous ways that respond to the moral reality of other persons and
moral agents. That being said, this process is also subject to errors and distortions, and the
individual can become morally twisted and may have distorted desires toward ends that are
unhealthy, immoral, or otherwise unnatural.
An individual can in this way become “stuck” in terms of moral development, either because
she is unable to progress beyond some initial stage or has come to desire vicious ends for
their own sake. Due to this possibility some interpret human nature as being inherently evil
or prone to conflict rather than harmony (Xunzi), but these ancient wisdom traditions
generally hold that human nature must be developed and is not innately or automatically
good or evil, perhaps good insofar as the nature of each thing is proper to itself.
Nevertheless, human nature can be perfected but it is not itself perfect or imperfect as such
and without reference to the development of the self.
Wisdom in terms of practical belief and action requires the proper kind of intellect,
knowledge, experience, and judgment. This is a honed sense of what to do and refrain from
doing in practical contexts, a capacity for judgment Plato and Aristotle called practical
wisdom or phronēsis.
A wise individual is able to act in the appropriate ways in the appropriate contexts relative
to the standards of the community and ultimately to the standards of human nature and the
nature of reality. The characterization of wisdom that results from these two related themes
is one that requires both an orienting theoretical framework and a practical skillset that
disposes an individual to think, feel, desire, and act in certain ways.
A wisdom tradition provides this framework and practical skill set, which can have the effect
of morally civilizing individuals in both thought and action. The wise individual is one who
knows what to think and do because he knows how cognition, affection, conation and action
are related to and sourced in human nature, which itself is an outgrowth of cosmic nature.
The wise individual is the human being who has reached her fullest potential qua human
nature, a fully realized state of eleutherios, of the freedom to be able to live a successful
human life and harmonize with the nature of reality.
Revitalizing Ancient Wisdom
Returning to our question, in this section I argue that these elements in ancient wisdom shed
light on why collective wisdom can save civilization by being an instantiation of it. I argue
that we need to revitalize or continue these wisdom traditions by updating them to meet the
demands of the contemporary world and reconcile them with modern scientific knowledge.
This will be a general sketch of what a contemporary wisdom tradition would entail and not
an exhaustive account that will answer all potential worries and objections.
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But first, it will be helpful to focus on what is false, implausible, and even dangerous about
these ancient wisdom traditions. Even if there are plausible aspects of these traditions, these
traditions and thinkers also have shortcomings of their own.
Perhaps the greatest mistake found in many of these traditions is an overemphasis on the
past, the prioritization of conserving social order at all costs, and an associated suspicion of
change.26 This tendency lends itself to a type of naturalistic fallacy, or assumption that
simply because things are some particular way that they ought to be this way, perhaps
because reality is governed by Fate or Destiny. For example, this trend can be seen
historically from biology-based gender essentialism, to the philosophical and religious
defense of 'slave nature' and certain kinds of racism, to the ad hoc metaphysical justification
of the caste system in India, to the reactionary nature of certain aspects of Confucianism,
and the list goes on.
Ancient wisdom traditions at times merely provide metaphysical and ethical justifications
of supposedly natural, necessary, or rational aspects of society that actually resulted from
contingent historical events, contingent ways of structuring society, and empirically false
beliefs about the world. The second major shortcoming that can render these traditions
implausible prima facie is their tendency to anthropomorphize27 reality and the natural world
to a degree that is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with a modern scientific
understanding. Given that much of what the ancients knew about the natural world was false
or distorted or based on certain cultural assumptions, it is easy and today commonplace to
consider these traditions superstitious, primitive, or otherwise backwards, perhaps even
“uncivilized” in terms of social, technology, and moral development.28
These two shortcomings must be recognized as serious, but part of addressing them requires
the acknowledgment that they are not isolated to these traditions alone. In terms of the first
shortcoming, many of us today often fall into the trap of assuming that the ways in which
we think, live, and structure society are somehow how they ought to be, e.g., perhaps
democracy or capitalism or egalitarianism is the most rational or natural or necessary
political, economic, and moral system, respectively.
26

Part of this is due to the cyclical conception of temporality found in these traditions, which stands in stark
contrast to a linear Abrahamic and later modern scientific conception of time. Nonetheless, in effect the focus
on fixity indirectly and at times directly supported a type of reactionary conservatism on the political level,
and at least in the Greek and later Christian traditions, the metaphysical priority of Being over becoming on
the metaphysical level.
27
By anthropomorphism here I mean the types of animism, vitalism, and projectionism that pervade many
ancient, traditional, and indigenous cultures.
28
Religious, mystical, and spiritual traditions, which hitherto provided this orientation are increasingly losing
influence and plausibility, both in the public sphere and intellectually in the minds of many people around the
world. There are, of course, good reasons why these traditional sources of meaning are met with such reactions.
It seems clear that we should at the very least no longer consider these sources authoritative simply because
they are traditions and we should be wary of any non-scientific claims or essentialism. But there are also good
reasons why these traditions came into existence and were accepted in the first place because they are
successful to at least some degree.
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Ancient wisdom traditions are no more or less subject to this cognitive bias than any other
tradition. The difference is that we have the perspective of history to see exactly how they
were clearly mistaken in many respects, though we lack the same perspective on ourselves.
That being said, because we now do know much more about the natural world than the
ancients, we should carefully reject those beliefs and values that were based on mistaken or
partial evidence.
To correct for this shortcoming, we can distill the general and recurring elements in each
tradition and jettison the idiosyncratic elements that likely resulted from contingent aspects
of these ancient cultures. In terms of the second shortcoming, the tendency to
anthropomorphize reality still exists, and perhaps this tendency is necessary to some extent,
because it is easier to explain what is more distant in terms of what is closer in our
experience, even in physics.29
However, this second shortcoming manifests itself differently today in the form of the
apparent contradiction between our scientific knowledge of the natural world and our
practical existence as moral beings. Many of us practically act as if morality and value are
real and objective,30 while also acknowledging theoretically that scientific knowledge shows
that there is nothing intrinsically valuable or moral or human at the "absolute" level of
reality. What we lack is a justifiable, coherent framework for reconciling our practical lives
and our theoretical belief, and without such a framework, we will continue to live out a
contradiction.
A revitalized wisdom tradition based on ancient antecedents can correct for these
shortcomings and reconcile these seemingly disparate domains, but only by updating these
traditions in relation to our contemporary world and recent advancements in natural science,
especially evolutionary biology. Based on our current scientific knowledge of the world, we
now have good reason and evidence to believe that at some more basic level the universe is
constituted by energy in various forms that cannot be accurately anthropomorphized without
projection and distortion of the phenomena. However, we also now have good reason and
evidence to believe that the same principles that constitute the nature of reality are also found
in and constitutive of our evolved human nature.
For this reason, studying human nature and our evolution can allow us to understand what
the ancients already knew about the relationship between ethics and metaphysics, even if
29

Physical events and experiments, even when derived from the use of computers and particle accelerators,
still require human interpretation, and necessarily, some amount of anthropomorphization. This is so because
we must relate whatever we may discover in the arena of physics to our everyday experience of the world by
using imagery, metaphor, and human linguistic constructs. An example of this is the names given to certain
quarks, such as “charm” and “strange,” which are distinctly human ways of sorting out physical phenomena.
30
‘Objective’ here means mind-independent. Value realism or moral realism is the claim that there are value
facts or moral facts and the existence of these facts is metaphysically, epistemologically, and logically
independent of our evidence for them. This is a characterization of realism put forth by David Brink; see Brink,
1989, p.5-7.
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the specifics formulation of the conclusions that we arrive at today will differ greatly in
some respects. That is, we now know that the world is not human. Instead, the human is
world, for human nature and experience are manifestations of the world, rather than
something above or below it. We need not anthropomorphize the universe, but understand
how we ourselves are cosmomorphized.
In this sense Bernard Williams is correct when he noted that, when viewed sub specie
eternitatis, or from an “absolute” view, there is nothing distinctly human or valuable or
moral to be found in the extra-human or mind-independent reality.31 But the fact that value
is not at the end of the day found on the "absolute" level of energy does not render it any
less real, at least not any less real than phenomena like life and consciousness, which are
certainly real in some important sense, though also not present at the "absolute" level of
reality.
One insight gained by analyzing these ancient wisdom traditions for our contemporary
situation is recognition that the relationship between ethics, metaphysics, and human nature
does not cease to exist when it is no longer recognized.
There are those who can and do act as if there is no such relationship, as if the rational mind,
the will, the soul, or individuality cannot be understood through reference to human nature.32
Still others pretend that the coherency of our experience can be maintained by either denying
the objective reality of morality and value entirely, 33 because they are seen as human
constructs, or by denying the objective truth of modern natural science, because it is
somehow dehumanizing or imperialistic.
But all of these options lead to incoherency in both belief and action. In the first case we
must deny the large part of our experience that is filled with value and normativity because
these are seen as mere illusions34 or emotive responses,35 mental expressions,36 or relative
social beliefs37 when compared to a world constituted by lifeless particles and uncaring
fields of energy. In the second case we must deny the objectivity and reality of modern
natural science, motivated in part by a reaction against what Schiller called the
disenchantment (Entzauberung) of the world and any feelings of belongingness in the world.
31

Williams, 1985, p.139.
Thinkers in these camps range from Phenomenologists like Heidegger, Existentialists like Sartre, who denies
that the for-itself (pour-soi) is causally determined by external factors, to Kantians, non-naturalists, and social
constructivists, who all to various degrees deny that reference to a transcendentally real or mind-independent
reality and human nature is required to understand human experience and wisdom.
33
There are numerous metaethical positions that provide skeptical, nihilistic, or anti-realistic accounts of moral
behavior, evaluation, and judgment. Specifically, in the emotivist camp, thinkers like A.J. Ayer, Rudolph
Carnap, Charles Stevenson, expressivists like Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard, as well as error theorists
such as J.L. Mackie, Richard Joyce, and other anti-realists like Sharon Street.
34
Mackie, 1977, 38; see Joyce, 2001.
35
Ayer, 1936; Stevenson, 1957.
36
Blackburn, 1993; Gibbard, 2003.
37
Harman, 1977.
32
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What a wisdom tradition today would need to answer is a question raised by Hans-Georg
Gadamer: “how [is] our natural view of the world - the experience of the world that we have
as we simply live out our lives - related to the unassailable and anonymous authority that
confronts us in the pronouncements of science?”38
These ancient wisdom traditions attempted to articulate recurrent patterns in both the natural
world and human experience toward the end of being able to understand how to achieve
certain goals and create certain kinds of human beings, the goal of wisdom and the creation
of wise individuals. A wisdom tradition as such cannot make individuals wise, but it can
provide the conceptual and practical framework that, if applied correctly, can foster the
cultivation of such individuals, if only fallibly. These traditions in effect provide a type of
“blueprint” for how to think and live successfully and given the recurrent pitfalls that arise
in the course of a human life.
Modern natural science and evolutionary biology provide the current best methods for
isolating and discovering recurrent patterns in the natural world that give rise to complex
forms of life, up to and including our own experience, and importantly, our very need for
wisdom traditions.39 What we mean metaphysically by Nature is surely different than the
externally, rationally, or teleologically ordered reality of the ancients, but there is
nevertheless enough order or regularity in the universe to permit the evolution of complex
forms of life according to certain patterns or law-like relations and forms of causation.
Biological evolution provides the current best explanatory account of how it is possible that
physical and chemical regularities or patterns in the natural world can give rise to life, selfsustaining biological systems directed toward certain goals or features in the environment
necessary for survival and reproduction. Although evolution as such is not externally
directed toward pre-given ends, the minimal necessary conditions for sustaining life and the
constraints placed on the organism by the environment lead through natural selection to the
development of relatively determinate adaptive organismal natures. For instance, a fern has
a type of adaptive trajectory or normal course of development, survival, and reproduction
relative to its evolutionary lineage and directed toward certain features of the (physiochemical) environment. Increasingly complex forms of life have similar trajectories oriented
toward certain features of the (internal) environment for minimally conscious creatures and
the (social) environment for social animals, from wolves to human beings.40
This evolutionary development of adaptive natures can be plausibly understood as a type of
natural teleology, though reducible to complex forms of efficient causation and not a sui
generis teleological principle as the ones found in ancient Indian, Chinese, and Greek
38

Gadamer, 1976, p.3.
There are those of course who believe that evolution demonstrates that value and morality are not real in
any mind-independent or objective manner (as the value and moral realists claim). However, a full defense
against this charge is outside the scope of this essay; see Ruse, 1998; Street, 2006; and Joyce, 2007.
40
Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse provide detailed accounts of how this naturalistic approach can be
used to evaluate human virtues in a Neo-Aristotelian vein. See Foot, 2001 and Hursthouse, 1999.
39
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traditions.41 Taking this seriously requires acknowledging that there is a normal trajectory
or course of development individually and morally for human beings toward certain ends or
goal-states; this is not fundamentally different than other organisms.
This is the naturalistic relationship between ethics and metaphysics. There are thus certain
thoughts, feelings, desires, and behaviors that are fitting or natural for us, in part because
these certain ways of thinking, valuing, and acting allowed our ancestors to live, survive,
and reproduce by fulfilling conditions of life and meeting the demands of the environment.
Flourishing is also made possible as a positivity that supervenes on the maximal state of
development, though flourishing itself was likely not naturally selected, because happiness,
excellence, and even wisdom are not directly fitness conferring. However, because our
cognitive capacities have developed to the extent that we are not driven purely by innate
instinct or learned behavior, we may fail to reach these goals if we have not been habituated
or educated correctly relative to this normal course, and importantly, when we lack a
theoretical and practical framework for connecting our needs and desires to their proper
natural ends in the physical and social environments.
Naturalistically interpreted, wisdom traditions operate by providing these kinds of adaptive
frameworks, to connect up our needs and desires with their fulfillment in a natural, healthy,
and successful way.42
This naturalistic proposal is currently suspect either because it is seen as a type of scientistic
reductionism or because it runs contrary to a large part of modern forms of philosophical
subjectivism43 and Neo-Platonic and Christian assumptions about supposedly non-natural
or supernatural elements of human nature. But there is also a general, Enlightenmentinspired, now mainly post-modern, mistrust of any appeal to nature as the basis for
understanding human nature and experience, especially given the aforementioned
naturalistic fallacy. This suspicion of naturalism and naturalizing projects is justified to a
certain degree, but the problem is not with naturalism as such, but with historical misuses of
the method and concept.
Even if human nature and ethics should be understood naturalistically, this does not entail
that simply because some act is natural it is therefore ethical; this would indeed be fallacious,
41

This entails a type of teleological or goal-directed causation comes operant. Teleological causation here is a
complex form of efficient causation which is not reflective as in humans but results when and because certain
actions have been successful relative to the objective conditions for the existence of life to the extent that the
goal of biological process guides means for obtaining that end. My account here is indebted to Harry
Binswanger's work, The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts.
42
My naturalistic interpretation of wisdom comes close to Mihaly Csikzentimihalyi’s own in his essay
“Toward an Evolution Hermeneutics: The Case of Wisdom,” but I do not make the claim that wisdom was
selected naturally in the course of evolution, in part because being wise by itself does not directly enhance
fitness. See Csikzentimihalyi, 1995.
43
Beginning with Descartes, modern thinkers who began with philosophical starting point of the subject
rejected non-skeptical versions of naturalism (e.g., Hume, Berkeley, Kant).
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just as the claim that simply because we have always thought and acted this way therefore
we ought to continue to think and act this way. Neither does this mean that rational reflection
and human choice are eliminated, for nothing about nature or reality can force us to act in
certain ways rather than others and what type of world we want to live in and create requires
choice on our part, a choice though that is circumscribed by objective facts about the natural
world and human nature, however.
With caution, we can say at the very least that human nature evolved in such a way as to be
disposed toward sociality, which means that human beings normally survive, reproduce, and
flourish by interacting with and relying on other humans on a regular basis.44 However,
human beings also normally have individual needs and desires that are non- or anti-social in
various ways, which must be channeled and met in healthy ways that are cooperative or prosocial.45 Naturalistically interpreted, morality can be understood as an adaptation for
channeling these needs and desires toward cooperative social functioning, whereby
individuals are induced to meet their individual needs and desires in light of the reality,
needs, and desires of other members of a particular social grouping, say a family, kin group,
community, or nation state, etc.
This normally occurs when individual needs and desires become embedded in the needs and
desires of other members of the group in specific social relationships (e.g., familial
relationships or friendship) or through extended cultural categories (e.g., ethnicity, religion,
nationality, etc.). This means that moral development requires cognitive, affective, and
conative capacities, as well as the appropriate type of upbringing and habituation, and like
all biological processes, this development is subject to disruption, distortion, and even
failure.
Nevertheless, human morality and moral development is constituted and constrained by real,
objective, or mind-independent facts about human nature, our evolutionary lineage, and the
necessary conditions required for social functioning.
Understood in this way, morality is something that human beings do in the same way that
flight is something that many birds do, something appropriate for their bird-form of life, and
a fully developed human individual will be much like a fully developed tree in bloom that
has reached its full potential. This can in turn be understood as a form of ethical naturalism,
a combination of philosophical naturalism and moral realism, though again different in

44

This is in contrast to animals that are non-social and only occasionally interact for the sake of reproduction
or a one off hunt.
45
For example, the regulation of alimentation ensures that a suitable amount of food is allocated to each
member to meet their respective needs, and the regulation of reproduction, coupling, and birth entails a
framework for controlling the transmission of genetic material. Now surely much of this process is largely
implicit and much of it is also the response to instinctual or stereotyped behavioral predispositions sourced in
our primatial and mammalian lineage. But they can and do raise the level of conscious awareness and (critical)
rational reflection.
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many respects from the naturalism and moral realism found in the ancient wisdom traditions
of India, China, and Greece.46
Even though there are general or universal characteristics of human nature, the social and
environmental context in which human beings live can greatly alter the specific form human
development and experience take. Context can be so influential that it can even lead to the
concealment of these patterns in reality and human nature, if and when we are unable or
unwilling to identify with the natural world or choose instead to define ourselves according
to social constructs or technological artifacts. This seems to be the case, as when we
understand ourselves through the categories of our particular time and place or understand
the human mind like a human-made object such as a computer.
To see the effect of social and environmental context on the expression of human nature, we
must understand how our contemporary social and environmental context differs from the
initial evolutionary context in which our ancestors lived for the majority of our anatomically
modern evolutionary lineage.
Anthropological data suggests that for over 200,000 years, anatomically modern human
beings lived in small, mobile groups, eventually forming into small hunter-gatherer tribes.47
In this context, each member of the social group would likely share similar background
beliefs, values, interests, and even genetic material with each other. Each member would
normally have a reason and interest in cooperating with other members of the group, even
if implicit, because individual needs and desires would have been embedded within the
needs and interests of others in the social group.
Compare this context to our contemporary one. Take, for example, New York City, a city
of over eight million inhabitants, a social context wherein individuals often have vastly
different beliefs, values, interests, and genetic backgrounds. In this contemporary setting it
is psychologically impossible to know each member of the social group, and consequently,
possible that an individual may feel no emotional, moral, or even human attachment to those
outside of the scope of direct relationship or the cultural categories which are strongly
identified with (e.g., ethnicity/religion/class).48 Moreover, an individual may have a rational
self-interest not to cooperate with the needs and interests of others outside of our own group
and special relationships. Still worse, an individual may even have a reason to act immorally
46

There are of course numerous ethical naturalist contemporary thinkers such as Richard Boyd, Nicholas
Sturgeon, Peter Railton, David Brink, David Copp, among others. However, these thinkers tend to stop short
of relating this contemporary form of ethical naturalism to its antecedents in the ancient wisdom traditions,
which in turn leads to an unjustifiable focus on consequential states of affairs and objectifiable psychological
states such as desires. What is lost is a focus on the agent-centered dimension of our moral experience, as
understood in the background of our evolutionary lineage.
47
Krebs, 2011, 164-165.
48
This is not to deny that hunter-gatherer societies treated out-groups in a similar manner. Instead, we now
live in a singular society that still has multiple tribes and associations, which cause social ills and can cause
social unrest. But hunter-gatherer societies were more insulated than ours today, and for this reason, there was
an onus placed on the mistrust of outsiders and a justified suspicion toward potential external threats.
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(i.e. non-cooperatively), if individual short-term needs and desires can be met at the expense
of others whom one does not know and is not related to in any overriding moral sense.49
This is but one example that demonstrates that the context50 in which human beings live and
understand themselves can change rapidly owing to technological and social development,
which is development that is not necessarily connected with moral development and at times
in conflict with it.
Social and technological development lead to a type of “gap” that exists due to the disparity
between the more adaptive context in which our ancestors evolved and our contemporary
context, which in many ways in maladaptive or leads to maladaptive development and
behavior.51
This gap can manifest itself in a number of ways, from a normative gap that opens up
between our rational self-interest and our interest in cooperation, to an empathy gap that
results when various subgroups must live in close proximity, and an authority gap that
requires increased levels of internalized authority in a context with increasingly less direct
authority control and intervention in private life.
All of these gaps result from the sheer size and complexity of social settings and can lead to
maladaptive, immoral, and unsuccessful thought and action unless filled. Even capacities
that were adaptive in the initial context may become maladaptive in another; for example,
the human ability to identify with a particular group or culture provides a basis for social
integrity and cooperation in one context, and in another, is the indirect source of
ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and racism. This is similar to the way in which we evolved with
the adaptive craving for sugar, salt, and fat and now are in an environment with an
abundance of these things with the result that we have maladaptive behaviors and an obesity
epidemic.52

49

An individual may nevertheless have a vested long-term interest and reason to cooperate, even with those
with whom there is no relatedness, but human beings also have a psychological tendency to prioritize the shortterm over the long-term, even if this is in some sense irrational, or at the very least, imprudent.
50
We should expect, for example, a society that lives in a desert environment to place a priority on specific
values and define specific actions as immoral; for example, the theft of water in a harsh environment must be
treated with a harsher punishment or prohibition than in an environment with abundant water. A population in
an artic environment will also vary accordingly. But because of certain objective constants (physical, chemical,
and biological regularities) certain values will remain constant and be true, for all intents and purposes, in all
socially possible environmental contexts.
51
This truth can be understood on the physiological level as well. Human beings evolved in an environmental
context wherein highly caloric forms of sugar, salt, and fat were rare. Today and through technology, such
food is widely available and this context stimulates and evolved predisposition we have leading to the obesity
epidemic now increasingly spreading the globe, in both industrialized and developing nations.
52
Factors such as genetics, poverty, and urbanization also contribute to this epidemic. My remarks refer to the
evolved motivational system that induces us to desire sugar, salt, fat in the first place that, when combined
with a particular environment, can lead to maladaptive, unhealthy, and deadly results.
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These gaps can and must be bridged even though they can never be completely closed
because they result from the structural differences in the size and complexity of a society.
However, these gaps can be filled or bridged through orienting frameworks, skill sets, and
education that can enable individual to cope with the challenges of living a successful human
life given the particularities of our contemporary context. But these gaps are not new and
have existed since the development of agriculture, which enabled human beings to live in
highly populated, fixed location cities. These gaps existed in the social setting of these
ancient wisdom traditions and part of their implicit function was to compensate for and
mitigate their danger to social order, harmony, and civilization in every sense of the word.
Ethnicity, religion, and nationality are well-known categories that function by organizing
individuals under a common category and group identity, but unfortunately they can lead to
conflict rather than cooperation when there is no common ground or shared life between
competing categories; a cursory glance at human history or the world today demonstrates
this.
We are in many ways currently still using categories and ways of thinking and acting that
worked and made sense in one context, but are now unintelligible, obsolete, and even
damaging. Indeed, many of the moral problems we face today are due to the fact that often
people are stuck using categories that are maladaptive in our context or identify themselves
by contingent characteristics or socially constructed concepts that emphasize the differences
between us rather than a common ground beyond all religion, ethnicity, and nationality.
Still worse, we are also heir to a mishmash of outdated and often mutually exclusive moral
frameworks that cannot change and adapt to meet the demands of the contemporary world.
But what this aspect of human nature shows is that the physical and social environmental
context can change the way in which human beings think and live in relation to each other.
That is, human nature is only relatively determinate and not static or fixed, and this means
that changing the environment in which we live can develop our capacities in different ways
to meet the differing demands of our contemporary society in adaptive ways (i.e. pro-social
ways). This requires a category that spans the gulf of difference, one beyond creed, color,
or flag that emphasizes a shared or common form of life, despite superficial appearances to
the contrary.
Collective wisdom amounts to reflection on the category of human being as such, through
the specific concept of human nature, which in effect is reflection on the shared common
ground of human experience. Collective wisdom is a process of becoming explicitly aware
of and articulating the cognitive, affective, and conative patterns that we initially follow only
implicitly and without reflection.
This enables an individual to understand what something like a need or desire or belief is as
such, what function it has, and thus which needs, desires, and beliefs should be identified
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with as appropriate, fitting, or natural for creatures like us and which are not (given the
context in which we find ourselves).
In effect, the wise and civilized individual is one who is able to mentally and practically fill
the gaps by mentally and practically simulating the conditions of our initial evolutionary
context (i.e. by thinking and acting as if we are all brothers and sisters, one big tribe, or
really all the same). This simulation is ultimately limited by our psychological and emotional
capacities, as well as our justified commitments to our close friends and family, but it can
allow us to compensate for the difference between our contemporary context and our initial
evolutionary one.
We can to an extent correct for the fact that we are now like the same species of fish taken
from multiple independent rivers and placed in the same aquarium, one filled with artificial
behaviors, plants, and rocks taken to be natural state, and haunted by leftover habits and
prejudices from our respective rivers that no longer work given the demands of a diverse,
pluralistic, and globalized aquatic life.
A collective wisdom tradition today would be concerned with what type of selfunderstanding and skill set are required to live a successful human life as such and given the
particularities of the context in which we find ourselves.
This calls for reference to and a prioritization of human nature, the only category that cannot
be rendered completely obsolete, the only one beyond the particularities of religion,
ethnicity, and nationality. Such an emphasis on human nature, however, differs from a type
of universal humanism, as an emphasis on and respect for humanity as such, for a 'human'
or 'humanity' as such and without condition does not actually exist, as there is no such thing
as a bare particular.
But it is possible that we can each come to think of ourselves first as human animals, natural
beings with a specific human nature, before thinking of ourselves as Asian or White, Jewish
or Muslim, and American or Chinese, etc. A wisdom tradition in effect enables us to change
our environmental context, and indirectly the expression of human nature, by changing the
available categories and concepts through which we think and live.
And it is by having a common form of life and common way of understanding ourselves
that we can be able and willing to cooperate with each other, despite surface-level
differences and distinctions.
Putting this into practice and living out the relationship between ethics and metaphysics of
course requires concomitant institutional53 and pedagogical mechanisms for transmitting
53

Jonathan Turner provides an important analysis ways in which social institutions serve the end of social
order. For my purposes, any successful wisdom tradition must be able to influence, inform, or create social
institutions to exemplify and reproduce the tenets of the tradition; see Turner, 1997.
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and reproducing the self-understanding and skill set required for this way of life in
subsequent generations. But ideally this would take the form of compensating and correcting
for the ways in which historical baggage and our contemporary context disposes us to
maladaptive and uncooperative thoughts and actions.
The goal is a society that best approximates or simulates the conditions of adaptive contexts,
in form rather than content, which would be a situation wherein individuals have a rational
self-interest in cooperating with other members of the social group, and perhaps more
importantly, actually feel moral sentiments and have moral desires toward others in the
appropriate contexts and despite empathetic barriers.
What we would need to create is a social and environmental context that is as adaptive as
possible given the physical and psychological limits of human nature, that is, one that
cultivates the higher or more cooperative capacities and dispositions that we have and that
channels the more basic, non- and anti-social capacities and dispositions that we all normally
have in healthy ways. But this is exactly what the ancient wisdom traditions were attempting
to do, though differing in the specifics, owing to the differences in environmental and
cultural context. This in effect creates a new type of culture, one that applies to each human,
which is not reducible to a particular religion, ethnicity, or nationality.
What we need to acknowledge, and what the ancient wisdom traditions recognized, is that
we cannot fundamentally change what we are, perhaps I should say "yet," but we can be
honest about our situation, and design belief systems, conceptual frameworks, educational
modules, and traditions that work with rather than against our human nature. Part of this
requires acknowledging rather than denying human nature, for human nature is not
intrinsically evil or fallen or in any way unnatural as such but only in certain contexts and if
we let social settings degrade to that point morally.
Now there can be no guarantee that civilization as a type of moral complexity may not be
decreased or destroyed, that social and technological development may not actually lead to
more complex and pervasive forms of immorality. Nothing about the nature of reality or
human nature can force us to be wise or civilized. This requires choice, but civilization in
the moral sense is a very fragile and precious thing that is worth saving and collective
wisdom is our best chance to create, maintain, and develop it.
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